

## Community resources

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*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 03OTTAWA703, CANADA ON NORTH KOREAN AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#03OTTAWA703**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">03OTTAWA703</a>	<a href="#">2003-03-13 23:14</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">SECRET</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Ottawa</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://aptn.ca/pages/news/2011/05/31/u-s-asked-canada-for-financial-help-on-north-korea-deal-u-s-diplomatic-cables/>

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T OTTAWA 000703

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NP/RA, NP/MNA, NEA/AGT, EAP/K, WHA/CAN AND IO/T  
BRUSSELS FOR USEU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2013  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [PARM](#) [KN](#) [IR](#) [CA](#) [NPT](#)  
SUBJECT: CANADA ON NORTH KOREAN AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

REF: (A) STATE 61830 (B) STATE 65141

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Mary Witt,  
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S) Canada shares our strong concerns about the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, and believes that Iran will be emboldened if North Korea abandons the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We discussed reftel messages with Marc Vidricaire, Director of the Nuclear and Chemical Disarmament Implementation Agency (IDN); Ron Stansfield, IDN Senior Policy Advisor; and Joanne Khouryati, North Korea Desk Officer. In the case of North Korea, Foreign Minister Graham issued a statement in January deplored the DPRK's intention to withdraw from the NPT, and reaffirming the central importance of the NPT. Canada has expressed its concerns to North Korea privately through its missions in Beijing and at the UN, but has little leverage on its own. Aside from continued humanitarian food aid, Canada-North Korea relations are at a standstill. North Korean officials were searching for an Embassy site in Ottawa, but the GoC asked them not to return when they left in December.

¶2. (S) Canada prefers to try to pressure North Korea through multilateral institutions, but is not encouraged with how that is proceeding. Vidricaire commented that if the UN Security Council is not prepared to take credible action - and he expects Russia and China to oppose such action - then the DPRK will get the wrong message. The DPRK will still be a major focus of the NPT PrepCom in April, but inaction by the UNSC will confuse the issue. Given the importance of turning the DPRK around, Vidricaire urged us to consider some compromise formula whereby the U.S. and North Korea would

meet bilaterally on the margins of a multilateral meeting.  
(NOTE: Canada's Assistant Deputy Minister for Asia-Pacific, David Mulroney, will be in Washington on March 20 and has requested a meeting with EAP A/S Kelly. END NOTE.)

¶3. (S) On Iran, Canada plans to express concern in its statement to the IAEA Board of Governors meeting next week, and to follow that up with a demarche on IAEA DG El-Baradei. Vidricaire cautioned that El-Baradei has limited personal influence on how the IAEA proceeds, as he is beholden to the wishes of member states.

¶4. (S) Now that Iran is being closely watched, Vidricaire was concerned that it might choose to follow the letter of the law in development of a full-blown civil nuclear program, and then be able to convert it to a weapons program on short notice at a later date. Like North Korea, Iran might choose a time of crisis, when the U.S. and the international community are distracted, to leave the NPT. Unlike North Korea, Iran would then have a large-scale nuclear program, and would present a much greater threat. Vidricaire said the IAEA would find it difficult to curb the Iranian program if it proceeded in this manner. He felt that Iran also saw India and Pakistan as role models - defying the NPT, bearing up under international censure for a number of years, and emerging at the other end with nuclear weapons.

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